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ABSTRACT 
The paper examines the welfare implications of price targeting from 
the perspective of when central bank has credibility of persistently 
achieving the target rates and when people have lost confidence on such 
credibility. In the former, it was observed that the principle of Pareto 
optimality holds while there will be welfare loss and social bliss denied in 
case of the later. The paper thus recommends a cautions monetary policy 
from the monetary targetters that will not affect the goal of ensuring 
maximum welfare and social justice in the society. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Over the years, the management of the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) has developed a view of how the Nigerian economy works, as well 
as processes that help in using this view effectively in the conduct of 
monetary policy. This policy objective is couched in terms of maintaining 
price stability and promoting non-inflationary growth which could boil 
down into promotion and ensuring citizens’ welfare. The primary means 
adopted to achieve this objective is to set aggregate money supply targets 
and to rely on the open market operations (OMO) and other policy 
instruments to achieve the targets. 
 Monetary policy in Nigeria has relied more on indirect transmission 
mechanisms. Overtime, the practice is to target the monetary base 
(Nnanna, 2001). However, the practice of targeting base money is based 
on the assumption that there is stable money demand function in the 
economy. The reliance on indirect transmission processes anchored on 
instruments which exact impact are not known makes monetary policy 
making in Nigeria a very challenging responsibility. A resultant of this has 
been large observed discrepancies between policy targets and outcomes 
overtime (as shown in table 1)  
 
 
MOVEMENTS IN DOMESTIC PRICES AND MONEY SUPPLY (M2) IN 
NIGERIA(2003-2013) 
Year Inflation rate  Money Supply (M2) 
 Actual (%) Target (%) Actual (%) Target (%) 
2003 72.8 9.0 19.4 10.1 
2004 29.3 9.0 16.8 16.8 
2005 8.5 9.0 16.9 15.0 
2006 10.0 9.0 29.3 15.8 
2007 8.6 9.0 31.0 10.0 
2008 6.9 9.0 48.10 14.6 
2009 18.9 7.0  12.2 
2010 12.2 9.3 27.03 12.2 
2011 23.8 9.0 21.6 15.2 
2012 10.0 10.0 14.0 15.0 
2013 11.6 10.0 16.03 15.0 
Source: Central Bank Statistical bulletin (Various issues). 
Sometimes, it is difficult to relate targets to outcomes in much meaningful 
ways, especially how these discrepancies affect welfare and marginal utility 
of income of consumers. Though, the Central Bank usually blames this 
deficiency on fiscal dominance. This paper intends to investigate the 
resulting effect of forward price targets error of monetary authority on the 
social welfare of people, especially the fixed income earners. These 
categories of people were chosen because they were considered as the 
largest consumer of domestic product in the country. 
 So far, the studies on Nigeria, inflation have been able to tell us that 
expectation in the price level have been tested under adaptive expectation 
where as the assumptions for rational expectation of prices are considered 
to be too strong for prices (see Terlumun, 2006). Thus, it is imperative to 
examine the ability of monetary policy at reducing forward-looking 
expectations to tolerable levels that are consistent with desired level of 
prices. Also, looking at the situation, where public confidence on the 
monetary targetters is guaranteed, such that, their current and plan 
consumption are based on the previous level of targeted price (which may 
be accurate or not accurate). 
 In order to contribute to this subject matter, this paper tries to 
incorporate the distortions in the price level occasioned by uncertainty and 
forward price prediction error by the monetary authority on the welfare of 
country’s citizen, especially the fixed income earners. In order to obtain a 
unique solution we adopt the Bergson-samuelson welfare functions. This is 
used for its ability in determining consumers consumption efficiency level 
(Pareto optimality) and the social justice (social bliss) level. 
 Apart from this introductory section, the rest of the paper is 
organized as follows; section 2 deals with welfare function of reasonable 
price targets. In section 3 we look at the welfare function with relatively 
large error of prediction. Section 4 reviews the policy implications of the 
welfare functions while in section 5 we conclude. 
2. WELFARE FUNCTION 
 The determination of socially optimal allocations of resources 
requires explicit comparisons of the utility levels of the various members of 
society. It is necessary to know whether a change from which some 
individuals gain and some lose is desirable. A common procedure is to 
express social welfare as a function of the utility levels of all members. 
 We assume that there exists a social welfare function of the general 
form; W = w (UA, UB, ---------------- UZ) ---------------------------------------2 1 
Where UA is the level of the utility index of the individual A, UB for B etc. 
but, for our purpose, let assume two individuals (A and B) whose utility 
functions are 
 
UA = UA (X1, X2, -------------- Xn) ----------------------- 2.2 
UB = UB (X1, X2 ----------------Xn) -------------------------2.3 
Where Xi is the amount of commodity consume by individual (A and B). 
 To be specific, assume that the social welfare function is; 
W = w (UA, UB)  ----------------------------- 2.4 
 The goal of society is to maximize 2.4 subject to the following 
constraints 
TASTES OF INDIVIDUALS 
UA = UA (Xa, YA) ---------------- 2.5 
UB = UB (XB, YB) ---------------- 2.6 
EXPENDITURES 
X = Px XA + Px XB = X (MAX, MBX) ----------------- 2.7 
Y = Py YA + Py YB = Y (MAY, MBY) ---------------- 2.8 
RESOURCES/INCOME 
MA = MAX + MAY ----------------------------- 2.9 
MB = MBX + MBY --------------------------- 2.10 
Where X = consumer good 
 Y = producer good 
Xn, YA are commodities X and Y consumes by A     
 XB, YB are commodities X and Y consumes by B    
 Px, Py are price of commodity X and Y respectively. 
MAX, MAY are income of individual A spent on commodity X and Y 
respectively. 
MA, MB denotes fixed status of income of individual A and B. 
If individuals have confidence on the prediction of monetary targetters due 
to their previous experience, then, current consumption will depend on the 
anticipated level of price (given that the previous prediction was 
reasonable). 
Setting Langanragier multiplier to our equations 2.1 to 2.10 
L = W 
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Take the partial derivatives with respect to all endogenous variables 
LXA = WuA UxA + l1 PX = 0 ----------------- 2.12 
LXB = WUB UXB + l1 = 0 ----------------- 2.13 
LYA = WUA UYA + l2 Py = 0 --------------- 2.14 
LYB = WUB UBY + l2 Py = 0 --------------- 2.15 
 To obtain efficient consumption, that is, the Pareto optimally 
condition from 2.12 and 2.14. 
WUA UAX/ = l1 /l2 (Px/Py) 
WUA UJA  
 For a constant and persistent prediction of px and py, the ratio 
Px/Py = 1. Thus, MRS XA, Y = l1/l2. 
MRS XA, y = MRSxB,y (Pareto efficiency) see Fig 1 for the 
edgeworth box that shows the contract curve. 
 To obtain other mix efficiency 
LMAX = -l1 XMA - t3  = 0 -------------- 2.16 
LMYA = -l2 YMA - t3  = 0 ---------------2.17 
LMBX = - l1XMB - t4   = 0 ------------- 2.18 
LMBY = -l2YMB - t4  = 0 ------------ 2.19 
 From 2.16 and 2.17 
 t1/l2 = YMA/XMA 
 From 2.18 and 2.19 
 l1/l2 = YMB/XMB 
YMA/XMA = YMB/XMB rearrange 
XMB/XMA = YMB/YMA -------------------------- 2.20 
 The implication of 2.20 is that, under the condition of reasonable 
price target we assume for monetary targetters, the marginal rate of 
spending on the two commodities by the two individuals are equal, 
tantamount to efficient product mix. 
 As well, from equations 2.12 and 2.14 with assumption of Px/Py = 1 
l1/l2 =UXA/UYA 
 From 2.16 and 2.17 
 l1/l2 = YMA/XMA 
Therefore, 
 UAX/UAY = YMA/XMA ----------------- 2.21 
 Under this condition, (2.21) the ratio of marginal utility equals the 
ratio of marginal spending of individual A. The same is applicable to 
individual B. 
 From equations 2.12 and 2.13 with equations 2.14 and 2.15, the 
objective of social justice is achieved. that is, 
WUA UXA = WUB UXB and 
WUA UYA = WUB UYB  
 The resultant effect of unreasonable predictions by the monetary 
targetters on the welfare of citizens is examined in the next section using 
the same approach. 
Fig 2.1 Optimum consumptions of Individuals 
 
 
 In the figure above, we show the points of optimum consumptions 
of individuals that maximize their welfare. Any point in the consumption 
surface circumscribed within the box diagram and not lying along OAOB 
general contract curve is not point of Pareto optimality. Thus L and T are 
not optimum welfare points. A movement from these points toward point 
H or I on the locus of the contract curve is clearly desirable because while 
one group of individual (A or B) is made better off, nothing adverse 
happens to the other and consequently the total welfare increased. 
3. EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY (FORWARD PRICE TARGET 
ERROR) ON WELFARE 
 Though, the traditional theory of consumer behaviour does not 
include an analysis of uncertain situation. However, von neumaun and 
morgestern have shown that under some circumstances, it is possible to 
construct a set of numbers for a particular consumer that can be used to 
predict her choices in uncertain situation. 
 In this section, we examine a situation where price targets of 
monetary authority fail frequently as we observed in table 1. Such that 
consumption of individuals is based on the target price plus the error (such 
as Px+e). To obtain a unique result, we assume for our purpose price of 
another good (say y) to remain constant (i.e equal to the target) and the 
two goods independent of one another 
 Like we have in section 2, the welfare function of the two individuals 
shall be; Max W = W (UA,UB) ---------------------------------- 3.1 
 The goal of this welfare maximization shall be subject to the 
following constraints. 
 TASTES 
UA = UA  (XA,YA)  ----------------------- 3.2 
UB = UB  (XB, YB)  ---------------------  3.3 
And 
EXPENDITURES 
X = (Px + e) XA + (Px + e) XB = x (MAX MBX) ----------- 3.4 
Y = PY YA + PyYB  = y (MAY, MBY)  --------------- 3.5 
With, 
RESOURCES 
MA = MAX + MAY  -------------------------- 3.6 
MB = MBX + MBY -------------------------  3.7 
Setting a multiplier function 
 L = w [UA (XA YA), UB (XB, YB)] - l1 [ X (MAX, MBX)- [(Px+e) XA + 
 (Px + e) XB] - l2 [Y (MAY, MBY) – (Py YA + Py YB) - l3 
 (MXA + MAY – MA) - l4 (MBX + MBY – MB) ------------ 3.8 
 The  definitions of variables are as defined in section 2, except Px + 
e which is the  target price of good x plus the error accruing from 
monetary authority mis-specification (we assume here for our case 1 < e 
£¥). 
 Now taking partial derivatives and set them equal zero. 
LXA = WUA UXA + l1 (Px + e) = 0 ----------------- 3.9 
LXB = WUB UXB + l1 (Px + e)  = 0 ---------------- 3.10 
LYA = WUA UYA  + l2 Py  = 0 ------------------ 3.11 
LYB = WUBUYB + l2 Py = 0    ----------------  3.12 
 Optimal consumption 
From 3.9 and 3.11 
WUA UXA/WAU UAY = t1/t2 (Px + e/py) 
 From 3.10 and 3.12 
WUB UXB/WUB UBY =  l1/l2 (Px + e/Py) 
 The ratio e/py prevent the marginal rate of substitution (x,y) for the 
two individual not to be equal, thus inefficient consumptions due to 
prediction error. The problem is aggravated especially when the error (e) 
is large. 
 As  well; 
LMXA = -l1 (XMA + e) - l3 = 0 ---------------- 3.13 
LMXA = -l2 YMA - l3 = 0  ----------------------- 3.14 
LMXB = -l1 (XMB + e) - l4 = 0 ---------------- 3.15 
LMBY =  -l2 YMB - l4 = 0 ------------------- 3.16 
 From 13 and 14 
 l1/l2 = YMA/ (XMA + e) and from 3.15 and 3.16 
 l1/l2 = YMA/XMB + e 
 YMA/Xm+ e = YMB/XMB + e 
:. XMB + e/XMA + e  = YMB/YMB ------------------------ 3.17 
 The implication of 3.17 above is that the ratios of marginal spending 
on the two commodities are not equal and thus not efficient because of 
the forecast error. 
 In terms of ratio of marginal utility for individual A; 
UXA/UYA {Py/Px + e) = YMA/XMA + e (from 3.13 and 3.14) 
Thus for the error (e) the ratio of marginal utility of consumption is 
not equal to marginal utility of in come (YMA/XMA). The same holds for 
individual B. now depend on whether UBX/UYB > YMB/XMB + e. (Welfare gain) 
otherwise there will be welfare loss. 
As a result of the error in prediction the goal of social justice may 
not be achieved because this condition requires; 
WUA UAX = WUBUBX and 
WUA UAY = WUB UBY . The  condition which may suffer with frequent 
prediction error by the monetary authority. 
In the next section, we shall write explicitly on the policy 
implications of all the mathematical expressions of both section 2 and 3. 
4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 Price stability in Nigeria refers to the achievement of a single-digit 
inflation rate on an annual basis. Indeed, this objective has not been 
achieved to a sustained basis. For instance, as shown in the figure below 
(Fig 4.1), the target of single digit were achieved in only three (3) times 
(2005, 2007 and 2008), while the rest of the years under the period of 
analysis experienced two (2) digits. In most cases, there have been 
discrepancies between the target rates and the actual rates, the highest 
discrepancy was experienced in 2003 (72.8; actual and 9.0; target) and 
the lowest in the year 2006 with just one percent deviation above the 
targetlevel. 
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 Going by the policy framework established earlier (the effect of 
consistent prediction error of target price on the welfare of individual in 
the society, especially the fixed income earners), we want to establish that 
Central Bank can face different types of uncertainty that may affect 
monetary policy decisions, such as; uncertainty about current and future 
data, the most appropriate model and preferences etc but instead of 
formulating a monetary  target that  will be characterized with errors, 
leading to the populace loosing confidence on the monetary authority, 
because their welfare is indirectly affected, Brainard (1967) has explored 
how a monetary authority  should respond to uncertainty showing that, if 
uncertainty is additive, a monetary authority with a quadratic objective 
function should display certainty equivalence. A more cautions policy is 
regarded optimal. However, when probability distributions over possible 
events are unknown, the author advocated that robust control methods 
lead policymakers to minimize the loss that arises. The signal extraction 
problem that accompanies imperfect knowledge of key input or target 
variables causes both Central Bank and private sector to learn gradually 
about the realization or shocks. This form of bounded rationality provides a 
plausible framework for modeling the behaviour of Central Bank and 
private agents. However when private sector expectations are determined 
by adaptive behaviour, like the one assume in our welfare functions,  
optimal monetary policy response more persistently to  cost-push shocks. 
The higher the private sector’s initially perceived inflation persistence, the 
stronger and more persistent is the optimal policy responses (See Gaspar, 
Smets and Vestin, 2006). 
 To cap it all, the interaction between private sector uncertainty 
about the Central Bank’s inflation target level (that is the Central Bank’s 
lack of credibility) and the Central Bank’s uncertainty regarding the private 
sector’s uncertainty about the inflation target can have serious implications 
for monetary policy, leading to policy errors and raising inflation 
persistence, thus welfare loss on the citizens (see also, Aoki and Kimura, 
2005). 
5. CONCLUSION 
 The  paper has examined welfare implications of inflation targeting 
from two perspective; one, the implication on welfare when the Central 
Bank has credibility of persistently achieving the target rate; two, when 
the monetary authority has loose individual confidence of setting what is 
considered a reasonable targets. In the former situation, using a welfare 
function that controls for individual tastes; expenditure and resources 
income. It was derived that efficient consumption level and social justice 
are still maintained while in later condition (Central Bank lacking 
confidence) pareto optimality failed to ensued, the ratio of marginal utility 
of consumption not equal to the ratio of marginal spending   (welfare loss) 
and there is no social bliss. The implication of which means that, monetary 
targetters should be cautions in all its policy as not to tamper with the goal 
of ensuring maximum welfare for the citizens in the society. 
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